The space shuttle was launched at reduced temperatures compared to those specified by Thiokol Engineers (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). The teams should have carefully analyzed test data and flow of different information. The issue of communication should have been taken seriously throughout the pre-launch period. This fact explains why every future space shuttle was equipped with SRBs containing three O-rings in every combustion chamber. The three O-rings would have sustained the gases and eventually prevent the disaster (Hall, 2003). The use of three O-rings could have improved the effectiveness of the SRBs. The two O-rings used to separate various chambers failed. To begin with, the failure of the O-rings shows conclusively that they were unable to seal gases completely after ignition. Several measures might have been undertaken to mitigate the risks identified above. Nonetheless, NASA decided to launch the space shuttle despite the existing concerns. The involved parties failed to monitor the critical weather conditions recorded at the launch site. This issue emerged because of poor communication between NASA and the engineers responsible for constructing the SRBs (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). This is true because the shuttle was launched at a time when room temperatures exceeded those recorded during various test missions. The third issue notable from this FTA is that NASA failed to adhere to existing test data limits. The members of the crew were not warned about the leakage (Donovan & Green, 2003). This fact explains why the crew could not cancel the launch after combustion gases escaped though the failed O-rings. The matrix indicates that the shuttle did not have effective instrumentation to send signals after the O-rings failed. The FTA can also be treated as a powerful risk assessment matrix. The joints failed due to increased erosion of gases. The occurrence of this phenomenon forced combustion gases to escape through the safety O-rings. A phenomenon known as joint rotation occurred during the launch process. The O-rings in the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) were constructed in such a way that “they could close tightly due to the forces produced during ignition” (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016, p. The first issue was associated with the construction of the O-rings. The failure of the O-rings led to the explosion of the space shuttle after 73 seconds. The above Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) of the O-ring construction shows critical issues that must have been considered before launching the Challenger. These three contributing factors led to the explosion of the Challenger. The shuttle lacked effective alarm systems to report failures (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). The O-rings could not perform effectively at lower temperatures.
This failure was caused by the defective nature of the O-rings and existing temperature variations (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). The other problem was caused by the failure of the O-rings.
For instance, the tree analysis shows clearly that “the temperatures at the launch site and the communication barriers between Thiokol Engineers and NASA led to failure to adhere to test data limits” (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016, p. Such issues contributed (wholly or partly) to the failure of the O-rings in the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). The above FTA model shows clearly that the explosion was caused by three major factors. That being the case, the Challenger disaster took place because of several factors. This means that events A or B (or both) must occur for disaster Q to take place. This is usually represented using the symbol (+) and is equivalent to the OR-gate. The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) model can be described using the Boolean algebra. Fault Tree Analysis of O-ring Construction and the Explosion Fig 1: Fault tree analysis (FTA) of the O-ring construction Analysis of the FTA A fault tree analysis (FTA) can be used to identify and examine the major factors that led to the failure of the O-rings in the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs).
The inquiry was also aimed at presenting appropriate guidelines that could be used whenever constructing new space shuttles. After the disaster, an inquiry was established in an attempt to identify the potential causes of the failure. The Challenger disaster of 1986 led to the deaths of seven crew members (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016).
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